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Henry Mayer, Josephine Faass, Michael Greenberg and David Lewis Abstract In 1994 the U.S. Department of Energy initiated a contract reform program intended to strengthen oversight capabilities, and to encourage the creation of contract and incentive structures which would effectively facilitate the treatment of onsite contamination and waste. The remediation and disposal of these legacy wastes is the core of the Department's environmental management mission (GAO, 2003). Despite a concerted effort toward achieving the goals of the reform, progress has been slow. Many projects continue to necessitate cost and time extensions, above those originally agreed upon. Although the Department instituted an accelerated cleanup program in 2002, promising to shave some $50 billion and 35 years from its earlier cost and schedule projections, there have been delays in critical project areas which call into question the attainability of the proposed reductions (GAO, 2005). Numerous explanations have been offered as to why achieving these goals has proven so difficult; many of which have concluded that flawed contracting practices are to blame. This article concludes that the root of the problem is much deeper and that the organizational criticisms aimed at the DOE are as much a legacy as the waste itself. Although the focus of this paper is on large former nuclear weapons sites, these types of contracting and organizational issues are often found at other government and private complex hazardous waste sites.
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